Executive Actions at the Forefront of Federal Court Decisions and Arguments
In six major—three before the U.S. Supreme Court and three in the federal courts of appeals—judges across the country are confronting the boundaries of executive authority and judicial intervention.
Over the past week in SCOTUS the justices heard arguments in Trump v. CASA, Inc. and rendered decisions in A.A.R.P. v. Trump, and Noem v. National TPS Alliance testing the reach of presidential power over immigration, deportation, and national relief orders. Meanwhile, in the lower courts, the Eighth Circuit’s decision in Turtle Mountain Band v. Howe and two D.C. Circuit oral arguments—Harris v. Bessent and Climate United Fund v. EPA—probe how federal judges should weigh agency independence, program termination, and racial vote dilution.
Despite varying subject matter—from birthright citizenship and grant clawbacks to redistricting and administrative removal protections—the cases share strikingly similar stakes. Each pits the modern executive branch’s assertiveness against longstanding legal frameworks meant to protect individual rights, institutional stability, or legislative intent. Together, they reveal a judiciary deeply engaged with the question of how—and how much—courts should intervene when presidential action collides with constitutional and statutory boundaries.
U.S. Supreme Court
Trump v. CASA, Inc. Oral Argument (Birthright Citizenship)
Transcript (5/15/2025)
President Trump issued an executive order in January 2025 that tried to end automatic citizenship for babies born in the U.S. to undocumented immigrants or temporary visitors — something guaranteed under the Fourteenth Amendment for over a century.
Several courts blocked the order immediately by issuing nationwide injunctions, which stopped the government from enforcing it anywhere. The Biden-era Department of Justice is now asking the Supreme Court to roll back those nationwide blocks, arguing that such broad court orders go too far and aren’t allowed under the Constitution.
The oral argument was less about substantive immigration policy and more a meta-debate about the judicial tools used to block government actions. The Justices grappled with whether a single district judge should have the power to halt a federal policy nationwide. Several Justices expressed concern that limiting such power could cause chaos, delay meaningful relief, or allow an unlawful executive order to stay in effect for years.
The big question before the Court:
Can lower courts issue nationwide orders that protect people who didn’t personally sue — or should relief be limited to the people named in the lawsuit?
Which themes dominated the oral argument discussion?
Theme / Frequency
Scope and legality of universal injunctions
██████████████████ (Very High)
Article III standing and remedies
████████████████ (High)
Rule 23 class actions
███████████ (Moderate)
Precedent on birthright citizenship
█████████ (Moderate)
Practical consequences for states
████████ (Moderate)
Judicial expediency and emergency process
███████ (Moderate)
Separation of powers concerns
██████ (Low)
Breaking Down the Justices’ Positions
Justice Sotomayor
Sotomayor emerged as the biggest critic of the government's position. She challenged General Sauer repeatedly, cutting off long answers and demanding clarity on whether courts really have no power to stop unconstitutional executive action unless plaintiffs file individually or as a class.
She invoked four separate Supreme Court precedents that affirm birthright citizenship for children born on U.S. soil, regardless of their parents’ status. Her language was direct, at times incredulous:
"That makes no sense whatsoever."
Sotomayor also offered vivid hypotheticals — like a president sending the military to confiscate all guns — to stress the dangerous implications of the government's position.
Likely Vote: Deny the stay (uphold universal injunction)
Justice Kagan
Kagan took a deeply institutional and pragmatic approach. Her concern was procedural breakdown: if only named plaintiffs are protected, and if the government doesn’t appeal when it loses, how can illegal actions ever be stopped broadly or quickly?
She questioned the real-world feasibility of the government’s proposal and pointed out the inconsistency in the Executive Branch’s adherence to adverse decisions:
"We only commit to saying it's illegal to this one guy who brought the suit?"
Kagan’s framing was not ideological but focused on systemic function, judicial legitimacy, and constitutional enforcement.
Likely Vote: Deny the stay
Justice Jackson
Jackson approached the case from a rule-of-law and systemic justice standpoint. She painted the government’s theory as one that effectively disables courts from stopping unlawful behavior, particularly when those harmed are unlikely to afford representation.
Her phrase —
“Catch me if you can” — became a rhetorical anchor in the discussion.
She also pushed back on the idea that broad injunctions are “unconstitutional,” instead reframing them as ordinary equitable orders directed at defendants. Her concern was that limiting courts too much will erode public trust and the very idea of judicial enforcement.
Likely Vote: Deny the stay
Justice Barrett
Barrett was cautious and focused on procedural nuance and enforceability. She nonetheless raised sharp concerns about how injunctions would apply to unnamed parties, who could enforce them, and what mechanisms (like Rule 23) were realistically available.
She appeared troubled by the government's unwillingness to commit to honoring circuit precedent, especially within the same circuit. She asked whether Rule 23 was being invoked just to delay broad relief.
While skeptical of broad nationwide relief, she seemed open to class-wide injunctions and did not embrace the full sweep of the government’s restrictions.
Likely Vote: Partial stay — allow class-wide or tailored relief, not full nationwide injunction
Chief Justice John Roberts
Roberts played a referee role (as is characteristic for him), interested in whether the Court itself could resolve these issues quickly without needing nationwide injunctions. He questioned whether percolation among lower courts was preferable to immediate broad relief.
He minimized concerns about emergency delay by noting how fast the Court moved in prior cases (e.g., TikTok), and pressed the Solicitor General to reaffirm that the Court can act swiftly when needed.
Roberts appeared to want a procedurally tidy outcome, likely to endorse some narrowing without stripping courts of meaningful tools.
Likely Vote: Partial stay — likely supports narrowing, favors Court-led resolution
Justice Clarence Thomas
As expected, Thomas focused on history and constitutional structure. He cast doubt on whether universal injunctions were ever part of traditional equitable powers and seemed to view them as a recent and problematic invention.
He drew a direct line between Article III limits and what federal courts may or may not do, clearly aligning with the government’s position that courts can only give relief to the actual plaintiffs.
Thomas showed no appetite for procedural compromise and is likely to advocate for a clear limitation on nationwide relief.
Likely Vote: Grant the stay — oppose universal injunctions entirely
Justice Samuel Alito
Alito echoed Thomas’s structural concerns but added a strong focus on judicial behavior. He warned of “district judges acting like monarchs” and expressed discomfort with the idea that one federal judge could block national policy for everyone.
He referenced past instances where judges acted too fast or blocked presidential orders with insufficient record, expressing deep skepticism of the lower courts' restraint.
Alito appears committed to limiting what district judges can do in emergency litigation.
Likely Vote: Grant the stay
Justice Brett Kavanaugh
Kavanaugh took a proceduralist middle-ground approach. He repeatedly pointed to Rule 23(b)(2) as a valid alternative to universal injunctions, suggesting that courts could still offer broad relief — just through the proper legal channel.
He acknowledged that universal injunctions have become more common as presidents govern by executive order, but argued that they may be legally excessive.
Kavanaugh seems prepared to reject universal injunctions while leaving space for rapid class-based relief in emergencies.
Likely Vote: Partial stay — allow structured class-based relief only
Summary of Leanings
Likely to deny the stay (keep the universal injunctions): Sotomayor, Kagan, Jackson
Open to partial or class-based relief: Barrett, Gorsuch, Roberts, Kavanaugh
Favor limiting court power, support government: Thomas, Alito
Based on the oral argument dynamics, judicial leanings, and procedural focus, the most likely outcome is that the Supreme Court will reject full nationwide (“universal”) injunctions issued by lower courts — but preserve the ability to issue broad relief through class actions or plaintiff-defined injunctions.
A.A.R.P. v. Trump (24A1007) (Per Curiam)
In A.A.R.P. v. Trump, 605 U.S. ____ (2025), the Supreme Court considered whether the federal government could summarily remove certain Venezuelan nationals under the Alien Enemies Act (AEA) without providing them adequate notice or a meaningful opportunity to challenge their removal. The detainees, allegedly affiliated with the foreign terrorist organization Tren de Aragua, were held in U.S. detention facilities and sought emergency relief to halt their imminent deportation. They argued that the government's rushed notice—less than 24 hours, with no meaningful information on how to seek legal recourse—violated due process.
The Court, in a per curiam opinion, agreed that the detainees were entitled to more notice before removal and that the district court’s failure to act promptly constituted a constructive denial of emergency injunctive relief. The majority vacated the Fifth Circuit’s dismissal of the detainees' appeal, granted temporary injunctive relief, and remanded the case for a determination of what notice is constitutionally required under the circumstances.
The Dissenting View: Skepticism of Jurisdiction and Class Relief
Justice Samuel Alito, joined by Justice Clarence Thomas, dissented from the Court’s opinion. At the core of Alito’s dissent is a rejection of the majority’s jurisdictional reasoning. He argued that the district court did not deny the detainees' request for injunctive relief but rather followed a reasonable and expedited timetable—giving the government 24 hours to respond before issuing a ruling. In his view, the Court’s conclusion that a 14-hour delay constituted a “constructive denial” was a mischaracterization that strained existing doctrine on appellate jurisdiction over interlocutory orders.
Alito was equally unsparing in his critique of the factual record. He emphasized that the evidence presented to the district court regarding imminent removals was “sketchy” and largely based on hearsay. Furthermore, the government had already agreed not to remove the two named plaintiffs—A.A.R.P. and W.M.M.—while their habeas petitions were pending. Thus, Alito argued, there was no real emergency justifying judicial intervention at the level and speed the majority exercised.
The dissent also highlighted the impropriety, in Alito's view, of granting classwide habeas relief, or even temporary classwide injunctive relief, without first undergoing the rigorous analysis required under Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. He noted that the Court was issuing relief to a putative class that the district court had explicitly refused to certify. Habeas corpus, he argued, is by nature an individualized remedy, and the named plaintiffs were not “typical” of the class because they had already received more process than most others.
Finally, Alito criticized the Court for granting certiorari before judgment, calling it a dramatic and unnecessary departure from normal appellate procedure, particularly since no lower court had ruled on the merits. He warned that by intervening so early and expansively, the Court was overstepping its appellate role and veering toward an unwarranted expansion of original jurisdiction.
A Pattern of Judicial Restraint and Procedural Formalism
The dissent in A.A.R.P. v. Trump is consistent with Justice Alito’s longstanding commitment to procedural regularity, and a narrow view of the judicial role in specific emergency matters. Alito has recently written or joined dissents that criticize district courts or the Court’s majority for issuing what he sees as hasty or overbroad relief without full development of the factual record or adherence to procedural rules. His opinions in cases like Department of Education v. California (2025) and Trump v. J.G.G. (2025) reflect the same concern for careful lower court process and institutional discipline.
Similarly, Justice Thomas has long been skeptical of expansive interpretations of habeas corpus, class action mechanisms, and due process rights in the immigration and national security context. He has repeatedly questioned the constitutional grounding of procedural protections for noncitizens outside the narrow bounds of the Suspension Clause and has been a consistent vote to limit judicial interference in executive immigration policy.
Both justices share a textualist and historically grounded approach to jurisdictional and procedural questions. Their insistence that Rule 23 should not apply to habeas proceedings echoes their broader skepticism of judicial innovations that expand rights or remedies beyond what the Constitution or statutory text clearly permits.
Noem v. Nat. TPS Alliance (23A1059) Order of 5/19/2025
Supreme Court Lets Trump End TPS for Venezuelans—for Now
In a significant immigration ruling, the Supreme Court on Monday allowed the Trump administration to move forward with ending Temporary Protected Status (TPS) for over 350,000 Venezuelan migrants, while ongoing legal challenges continue. The justices granted the administration’s emergency application to stay a California district court order that had blocked the termination, clearing the way for deportation proceedings and the loss of work permits for many TPS recipients.
A Shift Toward Executive Control
The decision, issued in Noem v. National TPS Alliance, reflects the Court’s broader trend of deferring to the executive branch in immigration and national security matters. Since returning to office, President Trump’s administration—through Homeland Security Secretary Kristi Noem—has moved to roll back TPS protections previously extended under the Biden administration. Noem justified ending the TPS designation for Venezuela on grounds that continuing it was “contrary to the national interest.” But a federal judge in California halted that move, citing evidence of possible unconstitutional bias and stereotyping against Venezuelan migrants.
The Supreme Court’s order lifts that block for now, allowing the Trump administration to act while appeals proceed in the Ninth Circuit. However, the justices were careful to say that future legal challenges to the revocation of documents like work permits and I-94s remain open, and the case could still return to the Court if the losing side seeks certiorari.
A Familiar Divide on Immigration Authority
Only Justice Ketanji Brown Jackson expressed that she would have denied the administration’s request. Her position continues a line of dissents that emphasize procedural fairness and limits on emergency relief—especially when sweeping policy changes affect hundreds of thousands of people. Jackson has previously pushed back on the Court’s use of the “shadow docket” to fast-track controversial executive actions without full briefing or argument.
In contrast, the Court’s conservative majority has repeatedly backed strong executive authority in immigration, including in Trump v. Hawaii (2018) and other emergency appeals involving removals and border policy. Justices Thomas, Alito, and often Chief Justice Roberts have consistently treated immigration and foreign policy as areas where courts should give wide latitude to presidential discretion, even amid constitutional concerns.
A short detour…Justice Recusals in Baker v. Coates, et al.,
Orders of 5/19/2025 (p. 2)
In Baker v. Coates, et al., Ralph W. Baker Jr. filed a pro se petition for a writ of certiorari asking the U.S. Supreme Court to review the Second Circuit’s dismissal of his copyright infringement claims. Baker alleges that Ta-Nehisi Coates and numerous co-defendants—including publishers, media executives, and entertainment companies—plagiarized his self-published book Shock Exchange across multiple works, including The Water Dancer, Between the World and Me, and other derivative projects. He claims they copied not just ideas but his unique language, characterizations, and the “arrangement of words,” supported by detailed side-by-side comparisons and linguistic analysis. The petition asserts that the lower courts erred in rejecting these claims based on subjective judgments about literary style, contradicting Supreme Court precedent recognizing protection for expressive structure and word order.
Several Justices may have recused themselves from considering the petition due to the extensive list of high-profile respondents, which includes major media corporations like Warner Bros. Discovery, Apple, Disney, and MGM. These entities may have existing or recent cases before the Court, business ties to the Justices’ family members, or involvement in judicial financial disclosures. Additionally, Oprah Winfrey and Laurene Powell Jobs—named as respondents—have known affiliations with civic, philanthropic, or educational institutions that may intersect with the Justices’ past or present activities. Recusal would be appropriate under federal ethics rules if any Justice had a financial interest, prior involvement, or a close relationship with a party.
U.S. Courts of Appeals
Turtle Mountain Band of Chippewa Indians v. Howe (CA8 5/14/2025)
Eighth Circuit Blocks Native American Voting Rights Case in North Dakota
A federal appeals court ruled this week that Native American tribes and voters in North Dakota cannot sue under the Voting Rights Act using a common civil rights law—Section 1983—to challenge what they say is racial discrimination in redistricting. The decision, issued by the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals, ends a major voting rights case unless the U.S. Supreme Court steps in.
What Was the Case About?
Two tribes—the Turtle Mountain Band of Chippewa Indians and the Spirit Lake Tribe—sued North Dakota’s Secretary of State, arguing that the 2021 redistricting map split up Native communities, making it harder for them to elect representatives of their choice. A trial court agreed and ordered new maps that combined tribal areas into a single district where Native voters would have a majority.
But North Dakota appealed, arguing that private citizens and groups aren’t allowed to bring these kinds of lawsuits under the Voting Rights Act, at least not using Section 1983—a law that normally lets people sue when their federal rights are violated.
What Did the Court Decide?
The appeals court, in a 2–1 ruling, sided with the state. Judge Raymond Gruender wrote the opinion, joined by Judge Jonathan Kobes, both known for conservative rulings. They said that the part of the Voting Rights Act being used—Section 2—does not clearly give individuals the right to sue through Section 1983. In their view, only the U.S. Attorney General, not private plaintiffs, should be allowed to enforce it.
They said the law focuses on what states can’t do—like racially dilute voting power—but doesn’t clearly spell out individual rights in a way that meets legal standards for private lawsuits under Section 1983.
Judge Colloton’s Dissent
Chief Judge Steven Colloton, who also leans conservative, disagreed with the majority. He argued that for more than 40 years, courts have allowed private individuals to sue under Section 2, and Congress clearly intended for people to have that right. He pointed out that hundreds of similar cases have gone forward across the country, and the Supreme Court has recently decided Section 2 cases that were brought by private plaintiffs—including last year’s Allen v. Milligan decision from Alabama.
Judge Colloton said the majority's ruling is at odds with both the text of the law and decades of practice, and that the law does protect the right of "any citizen" to vote without discrimination.
Why Did the Judges (Likely) Rule This Way?
The two judges in the majority—Gruender and Kobes—are known for favoring strict readings of federal laws and limiting federal court involvement in state matters, especially around elections. Their decision builds on an earlier ruling they made last year that also said Section 2 doesn’t give private people the right to sue at all.
Chief Judge Colloton, though conservative, has occasionally broken from his colleagues when he believes a legal precedent is being ignored or misread. Here, he emphasized the longstanding understanding that the Voting Rights Act protects individual rights enforceable in court.
What Happens Next?
Unless the U.S. Supreme Court steps in, private citizens in the Eighth Circuit (which includes Arkansas, Iowa, Minnesota, Missouri, Nebraska, North Dakota, and South Dakota) will not be able to sue under Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act—even if they believe their voting power is being unfairly diluted because of race.
DC Circuit Oral Argument in Harris v. Bessent and Wilcox v. Trump (May 16, 2025)
D.C. Circuit Considers Presidential Power Over Independent Agencies
The D.C. Circuit heard oral argument in a major case testing whether the President must be able to fire the leaders of independent federal agencies like the Merit Systems Protection Board (MSPB) and National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) at will. The case sits at the intersection of constitutional structure, modern administrative law, and a decades-old precedent—Humphrey’s Executor—that may now be under pressure from a more executive-power-oriented judiciary.
The Legal Stakes: Agency Independence vs. Unitary Executive Power
The Biden administration argued that the Constitution demands direct presidential control over all officers who exercise “substantial executive power.” Under this theory—endorsed by recent Supreme Court decisions like Seila Law and Collins v. Yellen—the President must be able to remove at will any official who enforces laws, litigates on behalf of the government, or makes binding policy. The government claimed that both the MSPB and NLRB fall within that category, despite their adjudicative character.
Opposing counsel pushed back by invoking Humphrey’s Executor (1935), which upheld removal protections for the Federal Trade Commission on the grounds that it acted more like a court than an arm of the executive. They argued that the MSPB and NLRB also serve adjudicatory roles and are not primarily political or policy-driven entities. As such, they argued, these agencies fall outside the constitutional requirement of presidential removal power.
Judicial Dynamics: Ideological Lines Emerge
The panel featured three judges with distinct judicial philosophies: Judge Gregory Katsas and Judge Justin Walker, both appointed by President Trump, and Judge Florence Pan, a Biden appointee.
Katsas and Walker appeared strongly aligned with the government's position. Katsas, a former White House legal official and frequent advocate of textualist and originalist views, pressed on the agencies’ litigation and enforcement powers, suggesting these moved them firmly into the executive branch. Walker, known for his writings on the separation of powers and enthusiasm for the unitary executive theory, likewise focused on whether the agencies’ decisions could override presidential priorities—raising concerns about diminished democratic accountability.
By contrast, Judge Pan’s questioning suggested skepticism of the government's broad claims. She repeatedly returned to the historical foundation laid by Humphrey’s Executor, and emphasized the dangers of unraveling decades of accepted agency independence. Her questions highlighted the risk of destabilizing a broad array of federal bodies if the court extended at-will removal to quasi-judicial agencies.
Humphrey’s Executor at a Crossroads
Much of the argument turned on whether Humphrey’s Executor remains good law. While the Supreme Court has never overruled it, newer decisions like Seila Law have narrowed its scope, emphasizing that agencies exercising executive power must be subject to presidential control. Katsas and Walker seemed ready to treat Humphrey’s Executor as outdated, while Pan argued that its logic still applied to bodies like the MSPB, which largely resolve disputes without making new policy.
The line between adjudication and execution was a central concern. Government lawyers argued that the NLRB’s role in setting labor policy and the MSPB’s power to appear in court as a litigant meant they were no longer merely neutral arbiters. The defense countered that these roles are either tightly constrained or incidental, and don’t change the fundamentally judicial nature of the agencies’ work.
What Comes Next
If Katsas and Walker align in the majority, the court is likely to rule that the President must have at-will removal power over agency heads at the MSPB and NLRB. Such a decision would mark a significant shift toward a more centralized, presidentially controlled administrative state, aligning with a broader trend in federal courts toward reviving and expanding the unitary executive theory.
Pan’s likely dissent would preserve the traditional understanding of agency independence, at least for adjudicatory bodies. But unless the Supreme Court steps in to clarify the limits of Seila Law and reaffirm or revise Humphrey’s Executor (which very well might happen), this case could significantly curtail Congress’s current ability to create checks within the executive branch.
DC Circuit Oral Argument in Climate United Fund v. Citibank, N.A. (5/19/2025)
The Heart of the Case
The central dispute in this high-stakes case is whether the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) acted lawfully when it abruptly terminated nearly $20 billion in clean energy grants awarded during the Biden administration to a group of green bank organizations. The plaintiffs—including nonprofits and state-chartered green banks—argue that EPA's termination was politically motivated, unlawful under both the grant agreements and federal law, and that they retain legal ownership over the funds already deposited into their Citibank accounts.
The EPA, represented by DOJ attorney Yaakov Roth, argues that this is essentially a contract dispute: the government had the right under the grant agreements to terminate the contracts, and any complaint about that should be heard in the Court of Federal Claims—not in the district court.
Jurisdictional Fight: District Court or Court of Federal Claims?
A major portion of the argument focused on jurisdiction. The EPA contends that because this is a contract dispute, the Tucker Act requires it to be litigated in the Court of Federal Claims, where plaintiffs can sue for money damages—but not for injunctive relief like reinstatement of the grants. Roth stressed that this case is not about constitutional rights or statutory violations, but about interpreting and enforcing detailed grant contracts.
In contrast, the plaintiffs’ attorneys—including Adam Unikowsky and Teresa Reed Dippo—argued that this isn’t just a contract dispute. They claim the government unlawfully froze and attempted to claw back funds that already belonged to the grantees, violating their property rights and possibly the Constitution. They also argued that the EPA’s actions were arbitrary and capricious under the Administrative Procedure Act (APA), and possibly violated the Appropriations Clause by undermining Congress’s purpose in creating the program.
Judges’ Concerns and Dynamics
The panel featured Judges Gregory Katsas and Neomi Rao—both conservative Trump appointees—and Judge Patricia Millett Pillard, an Obama appointee. Their questions revealed ideological tensions over agency power and judicial oversight.
Katsas and Rao appeared sympathetic to the government’s framing of the case as a contract dispute. They pressed the plaintiffs hard on whether their claims could truly be separated from the underlying grant agreements, especially when their requested remedy—reinstatement of funding—looked like a request for specific performance. Both raised the concern that if this was just a contract case, it belonged in the Court of Federal Claims, even if the plaintiffs framed it in regulatory or constitutional terms.
Judge Pillard, by contrast, expressed concern about the abruptness and political nature of the EPA’s terminations. She highlighted the timing—just before a scheduled court hearing—and noted the absence of any documented misconduct by grantees. She also questioned whether the EPA’s concerns about transparency justified canceling the entire program rather than amending the grant terms.
Stakes and Next Steps
The stakes are huge—not just for the plaintiffs, but for broader questions about agency discretion, program continuity across administrations, and the enforceability of federal contracts. If the panel sides with the government, the grants are likely dead and the case moves to the Court of Federal Claims, where plaintiffs can seek damages but not reinstatement. If the court sides with the plaintiffs, it would affirm a powerful judicial check on agency reversals of congressionally backed programs.
Judge Pillard seems poised to defend the district court’s injunction. Judges Katsas and Rao appear more likely to reverse on jurisdictional grounds, which would be consistent with their broader judicial philosophies favoring textualist contract enforcement and limits on court-imposed constraints on the executive.
A split decision—2–1—is likely. And given the size of the program and its national significance, the losing side will almost certainly seek Supreme Court review.
Takeaways
Taken together, these six cases form a snapshot of the American legal system at a crossroads. Whether the issue is emergency immigration policy, independent agency leadership, or voting rights, the central question is the same: how much discretion can the executive wield, and what tools remain for courts to enforce accountability? In these rulings and arguments, we see an emerging pattern of judicial skepticism toward universal remedies and growing deference to presidential control—especially in immigration and administrative matters. Yet through sharp dissents, searching hypotheticals, and jurisdictional splits, the courts also show signs of internal complexities. The outcomes may define not just the current balance of power, but how legal institutions respond to an era of rapid and often unilateral federal policymaking.
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And after reading the analyses of the federal district courts of appeal, unintended irony still thrives.
Timely.
(I was particularly amused by Alito’s complaint that “district judges were acting like monarchs” in supporting Trump who - dare I suggest - acts like a monarch. Irony apparently is still not dead.)